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EXPROPRIATION
TION -

-

FEDERAL

MILITARY LAW 59 -

QUESTION

JURISDIC-

POST-WAR LAW PRO-

VIDING FOR RESTITUTION OF IDENTIFIABLE PROPERTY SEIZED BY NAZI GOVERNMENT IS NOT "LAW"
FOR PURPOSES OF FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION - Dreyfus v. von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 835.
Plaintiff, in this most unusual case, was a former citizen of
Germany1 who had been compelled to leave his homeland by the
Nazis on account of his Jewish origin. For well over twenty-eight
years the plaintiff, Willy Dreyfus, had sought restitution from the
defendant, Augustus von Finck and his West German banking
firm, Merck, Finck & Co., alleging that the Nazis coerced him into
selling his banking house2 to the defendants for substantially inadequate consideration. The involuntary transaction resulted in
4
a net loss to the plaintiff of over one and one-half million dollars.
In 1948, a settlement was reached which provided for the payment of additional compensation to the plaintiff,5 but the defendants repudiated that agreement before actual settlement was
made. Accordingly, plaintiff brought an action in the Restitution
Court, administered by the United States Military Command in
Germany, 6 to compel payment. The Restitution Court awarded
judgment to Dreyfus. In 1950, defendants appealed to the Court
of Restitution Appeals where the decision of the lower court was
affirmed and the case remanded for enforcement proceedings. 7 On
remand, the Restitution Court, (which had been renamed the
"Restitution Chamber"), refused to enforce the appellate decision
and plaintiff appealed. At oral argument before the Court of
1. Plaintiff is presently a citizen of Switzerland. 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976).
2. Dreyfus was the principal owner of J. Dreyfus & Co., a banking firm in
Berlin, Germany, founded by his family in 1868.
3. This inequitable transaction was forccd upon him "because [the] plaintiff
was Jewish and under the Nuremberg Laws and other decrees of Hitler could no
longer own or operate a bank in Germany . . . [nor] receive fair, adequate and appropriate compensation [for a sale thereof to the defendants]." Dreyfus v. von Finck,
Civ. No. 73-5271, at 5 (S.D.N.Y., filed May 20, 1974).
4. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 4, Dreyfus v. von Finck, 534 F.2d 24
(2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835.
5. Id.
6. See note 21 infra..
7. See note 4 supra.
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Restitution Appeals in 1951, plaintiff's counsel announced that
a second settlement and the appeal was
the parties had concluded
8
summarily dismissed.
In 1973, however, plaintiff brought an action in the United
9
States District Court for the Southern District of New York
claiming that his attorney entered into the 1951 settlement without Dreyfus' knowledge or approval, that the settlement was
fraudulent in nature, and that the consideration for the settlement
was inadequate. ° Dreyfus alleged jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331 and 1350,11 asserting violations of his rights by the defendant under public international law and four treaties: the
Hague Convention of 1907 No. 4,12 the Treaty of Versailles,13 the
8. Id. at 5.
9. Civ. No. 73-5271 (see note 3 supra). After an ex parte hearing before
Judge Brieant, plaintiffs obtained an order attachment, pursuant to NEW YORK
CIV. PRAC. § 6201(1), in the amount of $150,000 and levied on defendants' bank
accounts in New York. The order was vacated after defendants posted bond. Judge
Brieant noted that: "[J]urisdiction over the defendant is probably quasi in rem,
extending only to the amount of the attachment. .. ." (Id. at 2.)
10. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 8, Dreyfus v. von Finck.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970) provides: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil cases wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $10,000. . . . and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States."
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1970) provides: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."
Dreyfus also alleged jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970) but conceded at oral argument that, since all parties were aliens, there was no diversity of
citizenship. 534 F.2d at 27.
12. The Hague Convention, No. 4, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539
(1907).
Dreyfus contended that Article 46 of the Hague Convention of 1907, to which
the United States and Germany were parties, contained provisions creating personal
rights. Article 2 of the Convention states specifically that it is applicable only to the
contracting parties and affords no rights to individuals. This treaty, therefore, does not
grant any private rights under which Dreyfus' claim could have been sustained.
Art. 46 provides: "Family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private
property, as well as religious convictions and practice must be respected. Private
property cannot be confiscated."
13. Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols, and Agreements, 19101923, S. Doc. No. 348, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., 3307 (1923).
The Treaty of Versailles, to which the United States was not a signatory,
was later incorporated by reference in the Treaty of Berlin, to which the U.S. was a
party and which was subsequently enacted into positive law by an Act of Congress.
The state of war declared to exist on Apr. 6, 1917, S.J. Res. 1 (1917) 65th Cong.
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Kellogg-Briand Pact,1 4 and the Four Power Occupation Agreement. 15 The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss
the complaint under F.R.Civ.P. 12 (b) (6)16 finding that plaintiff
enjoyed no personal right of action under any of the treaties cited
1st Sess., 40 Stat. 1 (1917), between Germany and the United States was ended by a
joint resolution of Congress, S.J. Res. 16 (1921) 67th Cong. 1st Sess., 42 Stat. 105
(1921).
The pertinent incorporation section of the Treaty of Berlin, 42 Stat. 1939 at
1942 (1921) stated: "Germany undertakes to accord to the United States . . . all
the rights and advantages stipulated for the benefit of the United States in the Treaty
of Versailles which the United States shall fully enjoy notwithstanding the fact that
such Treaty has been ratified by the United States."
Dreyfus contended that he could avail himself of enumerated rights under
the Treaty of Versailles. These provisions provided in part for systematic recovery
for victims of German war crimes, [Versailles Treaty, arts. 227-30 in Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols, and Agreements, sec note 13 infral; German
acceptance of responsibility for damage to Allied countries and their nationals. [Id. at
3419 art. 231] ; and the presentation of complaints by Allied nationals to an arbitral
tribunal for damage sustained in Germany. [Id. at 3470 art. 300]. None of the Versailles articles are self-executing because they do not purport to intervene on behalf
of German nationals who have claims against their own government. In other words,
private rights created by this treaty apply to the nationals of Allied countries only.
14. The Kellogg-Briand Pact, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 (1928):
Outlawry of War.
Article 1
The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective
peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations
with one another.
Article II
The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all
disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which
may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.
The Kellogg-Briand Pact, signed by the United States and Germany was a
prophylactic measure to restrain acts of international belligerency and to encourage
resolution of disputes by pacific means. The treaty was merely a compact among
nations; it did not confer rights upon individuals.
15. Agreement on Central Machinery in Germany, T.I.A.S. No. 1520 (1945).
The Four Power Occupation Agreement provided for enforcement of the
joint occupation and control of Germany by the Allied nations. It was strictly an
administrative mechanism to coordinate actions by Allied Commanders-in-Chief in
their respective zones of occupation. The agreement made no mention of private
injuries, reparations, restitution, or tribunals for redress of private rights.
16. Although defendants originally pleaded lack of personal and subject matter
jurisdiction, the court noted that this was erroneous and treated their motion as a
F.R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6) motion. Civ. No. 71 73-5721, at 4. See note 4 supra.
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and that plaintiff's claim under international law was defeated by
the Act of State doctrine" which precluded judicial inquiry .into
17. Basically, the Act of State doctrine is a corollary to traditional choice of law
rules and provides that United States courts will not challenge the validity of the
legislative and administrative acts of recognized or existing foreign states when such
acts are directed at persons or property located within the territorial jurisdiction of
the acting State. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964);
First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972) ; Cf., Alfred
P. Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 96 S. Ct. 1854 (1976).
The Act of State doctrine is far from absolute, however. The "Bernstein
Exception" evolved from two related cases decided in the second circuit. In Bernstein
v. von Heygen Frers, S.A., 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772
(1947), plaintiff's complaint, that he was coerced to transfer his business interests to
a Nazi designee, was dismissed by Judge Learned Hand who noted that United States
courts will not pass upon the validity of official acts within another state. Subsequent
to the court of appeals decision, the plaintiff was able to secure an expression of policy
from the Department of State relieving American courts from restraint in passing
upon acts of Nazi officials. The views set forth by Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor,
stated that: "It is this Government's policy to undo the forced transfers and restitute
identifiable property to the victims of Nazi persecution wrongfully deprived of such
property and . . . to relieve American courts from any restraint upon the exercise
of their jurisdiction upon the validity of the acts of Nazi officials." 20 State Dep't
Bull. 582-93 (1949).
The Second Circuit, acting upon the State Department letter, stated that it
would amend its mandate in the case by striking out all restraints placed on the lower
court providing in essence that the Act of State doctrine is inapplicable where the
Executive has clearly indicated that it does not object to a court's examination of the
validity of a foreign state's act, particularly with reference to Nazi actions. Bernstein
v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 735 (2d Cir.
1954).
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank, 442 F.2d 530 (2d
Cir. 1971), the Second Circuit stated that "Bernstein arose out of a unique set of
circumstances calling for special treatment, and hence should be narrowly construed
and, insofar as possible, limited to its facts." Id. at 534. Among the unique circumstances cited by the second circuit was the fact that the Nazi Government no longer
existed, and the acts which predicated Bernstein's complaint had been condemned
throughout the world. Id. See First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,
406 U.S. 759 (1972).
The district court in Dreyfus noted the plaintiff's tort claim is analogous
factually and legally to the claim pleaded in the Bernstein case. See note 3 supra.
While there is a strong argument to be made that Dreyfus cannot be compartmentalized
under the Act of State doctrine, that idea is wholly academic after the denial of
certiorari. In Menzel v. List, 49 Misc. 2d 300, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1966), the plaintiff
brought an action to replevy a Chagall painting seized by Nazi agents in Belgium. The
court held the Act of State doctrine inapplicable because the confiscating government was neither extant nor recognized at the time of the suit.
The corollary derived from Menzel is that a United States court is not to be
precluded by the doctrine from inquiring into the validity of the acts of foreign gov-
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the validity of the alleged involuntary transfer of his banking
interests.
After the district court dismissed the amended complaint,"
plaintiff appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit; 9 held: affirmed.20
On appeal to the Second Circuit, plaintiff argued de novo that
Military Government Law 59 afforded him additional grounds for
relief.21 Judge Van Graafeiland rejected arguments based on
ernments no longer extant or recognized by the United States Government either at
the time the act in question occurred or at the time of suit. This principle would seem
to bar application of the Act of State doctrine in the Dreyfus case as well. A United
States court would, therefore, not have been precluded from inquiring into the validity
of the "creeping expropriation" of the Dreyfus property in 1938 by the Nazi government. It is uncontrovertible that in 1938 nonrecognition extended to Nazi Germany,
the time of the act; continued through the initial filing of the complaint in United
States District Court in 1973; and to the present, where there is no effort to rescind
nonrecognition and validate retroactively the acts of the defunct regime.
Therefore, the factual elements peculiar to Dreyfus alone would seemingly
preclude any assertion that the United States courts are constrained from inquiring
into the validity of the German "creeping expropriation" of 1938.
18. Plaintiff moved for reargument and rehearing, pursuant to Rule 9(m) of
the General Rules of the Southern District of New York; this motion was granted on
June 24, 1974. An amended complaint was filed on July 24, 1974. Defendants moved
to dismiss the amended complaint under F.R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6) on Sept. 11, 1974 and
the motion was granted by the Court. Dreyfus v. von Finck, Civ. No. 73-5271"at 1,
(S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 2, 1975).
19. Appeal was filed on Feb. 18, 1975. On May 15, 1975, plaintiff moved for
remand to the district court because counsel, in preparing appellate briefs, concluded
that Military Law 59, Restitution of Identifiable Property, 12 Fed. Reg. 7983 (1947),
might furnish an additional basis for jurisdiction to the district court. In the interest
of expeditious resolution, defendants stipulated that they would not object to the
circuit court's review of this additional contention. It is on this basis that the question
of Military Law 59 was before the court.
20. 534 F.2d 24, 31.
21. Military Law 59, 12 Fed. Reg. 7983 (1947), was promulgated to facilitate
the prompt restitution of identifiable property lost or taken during World War II.
In order to initiate claims for restitution, a written petition had to be filed with a
Central Filing Agency which forwarded the claim for determination to the appropriate
Restitution Agency [arts. 55, 56, 58]. If no objection was raised against the petition,
an order was issued granting the relief prayed for [art. 621. If, however, an objection
was made, the Restitution Agency attempted to reach an amicable settlement. If such
an accord could not be reached, the conflict was then referred to the Restitution
Chamber [art. 63], which adjusted the legal relations of the parties in interest according to the provisions of Military Law 59 [art. 67]. Appeals from the Chamber originally went to a Board of Review [art. 68]. In 1950, this Board was replaced by the
Court of Restitution Appeals [15 Fed. Reg. 1547 (1950)] whose decisions were not
subject to further review [15 Fed. Reg. 1548 (1950)].
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Military Law 59 on the grounds that the court had no jurisdiction
to vindicate rights created by military law inasmuch as such rights
could not be said to have arisen under "the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States. '22 With respect to plaintiff's other
assertions, Judge Van Graafeiland agreed with the lower court
that since plaintiff's complaint set forth at least a colorable claim
under the four cited treaties and under the law of nations, jurisdiction was invoked properly under §§ 1331 and 1350.23 On the
merits, the Second Circuit ruled that plaintiff was not vested with
rights under any of the treaties upon which he relied. 4 Further,
plaintiff's claim under the law of nations was rejected for the
reason that "violations of international law do not occur when the
aggrieved parties are nationals of the acting state.' ' 25 The Second
Circuit concluded that Military Law 59 was not a "law" of the
United States for purposes of federal question jurisdiction. The
court reasoned that the term "laws" within the meaning of § 1331
refers principally to laws of statutory origin. The court did
acknowledge that the term has been expanded to include federal
common law as well.2
Military Law 59 was promulgated pursuant to the general
authority delegated to the Commanding General of the United
States Armed Forces in Germany 29 under a valid exercise of the
"foreign relations" power vested in the President by the United
22. 534 F.2d 29.

23. Id. at 27.
24. Id. at 30.
25. Id. at 31.
26. Id. at 28.
27. See Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913) ; Bell v. Hood,
327 U.S. 678 (1945). Under the criteria delineated in Bell, Dreyfus' complaint is not
"wholly insubstantial or frivolous" such that jurisdiction could be denied. Where a
cause of action is created by federal law, it "arises under the ...
laws . . . of the
U.S." within the meaning of § 1331 ; the suit arises under the law which creates the
cause. American Well Works Co. v. Layne and Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916).
See also Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952), reh. denied, 356 U.S. 952 (1957).
28. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
29. See United States Area of Control, Proclamation No. 1, 12 Fed. Reg. 6997
(1945). The President established through the Commanding General of the United
States Forces, Military Government Courts in the nature of military commissions.
More specifically, Military Government Courts, as distinguished from courtsmartial, were given jurisdiction over all persons, including civilians subject to military
law and over offenses under the laws of the occupied territory. United States Military
Government Ordinance No. 2, Military Government Courts, 12 Fed. Reg. 2190-91

(1946).
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States Constitution. 0 The Second Circuit ruled that this type of
executive action did not qualify as a "law" of the United States
for § 1331 purposes.31
The case law cited by the court in support of this position
appears to be unconvincing. The most recent decision relied upon
by the court was a 1973 Seventh Circuit case, Stevens v. Carey,3 2
in which a federal civil service employee brought an action against
his federally-recognized union for reinstatement as a union member and other relief. In that case, plaintiff contended that defendants had deprived her of her right to participate in union
affairs in violation of an executive order. She alleged jurisdiction
under § 1331 on the grounds that executive orders, like congressional enactments, have the full force and effect of "laws ... of
the United States." The court impliedly held that executive
orders are the equivalent of "laws" only when issued pursuant to
statutory authority providing for presidential implementation. 33
However, the court did not expressly foreclose the possibility that
executive orders issued without statutory authority could qualify
as "laws" under § 1331. Rather, the court appears to have based
its conclusion on the view that the particular executive order in
question did not explicitly confer jurisdiction upon the United
States district courts to vindicate the collective bargaining rights
of federal employees.
Stevens, in concert with other similar decisions cited by the
court in Dreyfus,34 involved executive orders which essentially
30. The two constitutional sources of the "foreign relations" power as they relate
to the Executive may be found in U.S. Const. art. II. § 2, cl. 1: "The President shall
be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States... " and cl. 2:
"He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties . . . and . . . shall appoint ambassadors and other public ministers and
consuls ..
" See generally L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION
39-54 (1972).
31. 534 F.2d at 29.
32. 483 F.2d 188 (7th Cir. 1973),

33. Id. at 190.
34. See National Ass'n of Internal Revenue Employees v. Dillon, 123 U.S. App.
D.C. 58, 356 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ; Manhattan-Bronx Postal Union v. Gronouski,
121 U.S. App. D.C. 321, 350 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978
(1966) ; McDaniel v. Brown & Root, Inc., 172 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1949) ; Crabb v.
Welden Bros., 164 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1947) ; Sweet v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 68 F. Supp.
782 (N.D. Ohio 1946), appeal dismissed on other grounds, 174 F.2d 1022 (6th Cir.
1949) (per curiarn); Lodge 1647 and Lodge 1904 American Fed. of Gov't Employees
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dealt with "housekeeping" functions strictly within the purview
of the executive department. It did not address the question of
whether an executive order might have the status of law when
promulgated pursuant to a specific grant of constitutional authority, as had been the case with Military Law 59.
Executive orders may carry the full force and effect of law
if they are issued pursuant to statutory or constitutional authority.3 5 In the instant case, Military Law 59 was promulgated
by the Commanding General of Occupied Germany in the exercise
of powers delegated to him directly by the President of the United
States as Commander-in-Chief. The Supreme Court had recognized, in Madsen v. Kinsella,3 6 that in the absence of congressional
attempts to limit the President's power as Commander-in-Chief
of the Army and Navy, the President by virtue of his inherent
constitutional authority may prescribe jurisdiction and procedure
for military commissions in territory occupied by the Armed
Forces of the United States.3 7 Furthermore, it is now generally
recognized, that congressional authorization is not a necessary
prerequisite to issue executive orders in furtherance of American foreign policy and to direct the course of the international
relations of the United States. 8
v. McNamara, 291 F. Supp. 286 (M.D. Pa. 1968); Canal Zone Central Trade Labor
Union v. Fleming, 246 F. Supp. 998 (D. Canal Zone 1965), rev'd on other grounds,
383 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1967).
35. See Legal Aid Society of Alameda Co. v. Brennan, 381 F. Supp. 125 (N.D.
Cal. 1974) ; Worthy v. Herter, 106 U.S. App. D.C. 158, 270 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1959)
cf., Traylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 871 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
36. 343 U.S. 362 (1952). This case concerned the jurisdiction of a civilian citizen
of the United States who was the defendant wife of a member of the United States
Armed Forces charged with murdering her husband within the United States area of
control in Germany. The Supreme Court affrmed the court of appeals action discharging the writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that jurisdiction of the United
States Courts of the Allied High Commission for Germany had been established by
executive decree.
37. The Dreyfus court cited the case of Rose v. McNamara, 126 U.S. App. D.C.
179, 375 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 859 (1967), in support of
the dubious proposition that the President may establish tribunals in occupied territory
only in those instances where he has been expressly authorized to do so by congressional mandate. That case did not, however, purport to assess the validity of an
executive order creating a military or quasi-military tribunal where the Executive's
authority derives exclusively from the terms of Article II of the United States Constitution such as was the case, arguably, with the order giving rise to Military Law 59.
38. See, e.g., MacEwen v. Rush, 228 F. Supp. 306 (E.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd. 344 F.2d
963 (3d Cir. 1965).

EXPROPRIATION

-

MILITARY LAW 59

The Restitution Courts established under Military Law 59
derive their constitutional authority from the executive orders
which established the Military Government Courts."9 These ex40
ecutive orders were issued pursuant to constitutional authority
and thus, should have the force and effect of "law" under § 1331.
The court of appeals may have acted prematurely in refusing to
recognize the status of restitutionary tribunals as § 1331 "law"
courts - courts whose legal authority stems from executive decrees exercised in accordance with the President's inherent
constitutional power to wage war and direct the foreign relations
of the U.S.
On the merits, the plaintiff presented a substantial claim for
relief under Military Law 59. That ordinance provided, in particular, for the speedy restitution of identifiable property wrongfully taken under the auspices of the Nazi regime. 41 Additionally,
it included a lucid definition of acts constituting confiscation,4 2
a presumption of confiscation in favor of the claimant,43 and gave
the restitution courts power to rescind any duressful transfer of
property. 44
The factual situation in Dreyfus was not a case of first impression for the courts created under Military Law 59. In Osthoff
v. Hofele," the Court of Restitution Appeals upheld the compensation claims of a former furniture store owner who, despite his
wife's membership in the Nazi party, was compelled to settle his
business for less than a fair market price as a result of the German
authorities' refusal to grant him an operating license because of
his "pro-Jewish" attitude. In Poehimann v. Kulbacher Spinnerei
39. Note 29 supra. See also Exec. Order No. 10,062, 14 Fed. Reg. 2965 (1949),
by which the President vested the authority of the United States Military Government
in a civilian acting as the United States High Commissioner for Germany: he possessed "authority, under immediate supervision of the Secretary of State (subject,
however, to consultation with and ultimate direction of the President) to exercise all
of the governmental functions of the United States in Germany (other than the command of troops)... ."
40. See note 30 supra.

41. Military Law 59, 12 Fed. Reg. 7983 (1947).
42. Id. art. 2.

43. Id. art. 3.
44. Id. art. 4.

45. I U.S. Ct. Restitution App. Rep. 111 (1951).
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A.G.,48 the same court upheld restitution in favor of a hotel owner
who sold his business because of a series of officially sanctioned
boycott pressures, resulting from his marriage to a Jew. These
cases indicate that involuntary sales for less than adequate consideration and transfers resulting from official pressure short of
deprivations which are comactual force are the kind of wealth
4
pensible under Military Law 59. 7
The Second Circuit hinted that even if Dreyfus could have
overcome the jurisdictional barrier to his claim under Military
Law 59 he would have been barred by the special limitations
provision in the statute, not to mention the affirmative defense
of laches in resuscitating his claim in United States federal
court. The statute of limitations under Military Law 59 required
petitions for restitution to be submitted to the Central Filing
Agency on or before December 31, 1948.48 Plaintiff filed within
the statutory period and, thus, would not have been barred by the
statute of limitations. Article 57 of Military Law 59 stipulatedthat "any claim within the scope of this law may be prosecuted
only under provisions and within the periods of limitation, set
forth in this law." It might have been argued that by voluntarily
dismissing his action in 1951, the plaintiff relinquished all rights
to restitution under Military Law 59, since any attempt to renew
his petition thereafter would not meet the limitations requirement
of article 57. It is, however, well established that a court of equity
will not dismiss a claim because of statute of limitations, where
the expiration of the plaintiff's claim was brought about by the
fraudulent act of the party pleading limitation in bar.49 Since
Dreyfus alleged that the 1951 settlement was procured through

the fraudulent devices of the defendant, the statute of limitations
would not have presented an insurmountable obstacle to plaintiff's
46. 3 U.S. Ct. Restitution App. Rep. 701 (1952).
47. Wealth deprivation describes a "public or publicly authorized imposition of
a wealth loss, (or blocking of a wealth gain), at whatever time, by whatever means,
with whatever intensity and for whatever claimed purpose; involving the denial of a
quid pro quo to the party who sustains the deprivation." See Weston, "Constructive
Takings" under International Law: A Modest Foray into the Problem of "Creeping
Expropriations," 16 VA. J. INT'L L. at 103 (1975).
48. Military Law 59, art. 56.
49. See McCarthy v. Cahill, 249 F. Supp. 194 (D.D.C. 1966); See also Wu v.
Keeny, 384 F. Supp. 1161 (D.D.C. 1974) ; cf., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392
(1946).
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claim. Even so, Dreyfus would still have had to overcome the
equitable defense of laches, inasmuch as a period of 22 years transpired between the date of the settlement and the commencement
of his suit in federal court. It is uncontroverted that an attorney
of record may not compromise the final disposition of the case
without express authority from the client. While there is no
fixed period within which a person must assert his claim or be
barred by laches, the length of time depends upon the facts and
circumstances of the particular case. A mere delay in asserting a
right does not of itself constitute laches. The delay must work
to the disadvantage and prejudice of the defendant.5 1 It remains
sound judicial policy that whether or not laches attaches is a
question of fact for the jury, and that the final determination is
based upon the equities of the individual situation, adduced
from all the evidence at trial.5 2
An analysis of Military Law 59 as "law" under § 1331 reveals
that the Second Circuit's affirmance of the 12 (b) (6) dismissal
was premature. The plaintiff presented a legal claim entitling
him to judicial relief. The court improvidently granted the
defendants' 12 (b) (6) motion, failing to construe the complaint
in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, as is normally required. 3
It is unlikely that American courts will confront many more
lawsuits arising out of events similar to those which gave rise to
the Dreyfus litigation. Thus, it may be that the principal case
will have historical interest only.
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit's disposition of the issues in
Dreyfus on jurisdictional grounds was tenuous at best. Simply,
it was a procedural maneuver to mollify, if not entirely to circumvent, the more subtle and emotional issue of German wartime reparations and its effect upon contemporary relations
between West Germany and the United States. Finally, the
50. See Thomas v. Colorado Trust Deed Fund, Inc., 366 F.2d 126 (10th Cir.
1966); Whitehead v. Eagle-Pincher Co., 258 F. Supp. 308 (N.D. Okla. 1966).
51. See Lake Development Enterprises v. Kojetinsky, 210 S.W.2d 361 (Mo. App.
1966).
52. See Siemens Aktiengesellschaft v. Beltone Electronics Corp., 381 F. Supp. 47
(N.D. Ill. 1974).

53. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959) ; Ott v. MidlandRoss Corp., 523 F.2d 1367 (6th Cir. 1975).
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court of appeals was/clearly incorrect in stating by way of dicta
that adjudication of Dreyfus' claim would have been barred, in
any event, by the political question doctrine. 4
Gilbert J. Genn

54. The Second Circuit asserted that in times of war, executive decisions are
generally political and military in nature and consequently, are not judicially reviewable.
See United States v. Shaughnessy, 177 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
948 (1950); DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368, 1370 (2d Cir. 1971) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 979 (1972) ; Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972),
aff'd by order, 411 U.S. 911 (1973). Arguably, the court failed to recognize the
different aspects of the doctrine in the areas of domestic and foreign relations. The
domestic version of the political question doctrine was first adumbrated in Marbury v.
Madison where Chief Justice Marshall said:
By the Constitution of the United States, the President is vested with certain
political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is
accountable only to his country in his political character and to his own conscience.
To aid him in the performance of these duties, he is authorized to appoint certain
officers, who act by his authority, and in conformity with his orders. In such
cases, their acts are his act . . . still there exists, and can exist, no power to
control that discretion. The objects are political: they respect the nation, not
individual rights, and being entrusted to the executive, the decision of the executive
is conclusive.
1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137, 165 (1803).
Further amplification continued on the Marbury theme throughout the 19th and
early 20th centuries. See Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat (19 U.S.) 264; Foster v.
Neilson, 2 Pet. (27 U.S.) 253 (1829); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. (30 U.S.)
120 (1831) ; Cuther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (1849); In re Baiz, 135 U.S. 403 (1890)
Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
In Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927), the Supreme Court added a caveat
to this line of domestic cases by cautioning that the mere infusion of the political
process into the issues of a law suit does not preclude federal court jurisdiction because
of the political question doctrine. Justice Holmes speaking for a unanimous court
commented:
The question that the subject matter of the suit is political is little more than a
play upon words. Of course, the petition concerns political action but it alleges and
seeks to recover for private damage. That private damage may be caused by such
political action and may be recovered for in a suit at law hardly has been doubted
for over two hundred years .... Id. at 540.
In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court proceeded to formulate criteria for determining
whether an issue constituted a political question:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
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for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independe.nt resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due to coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political, decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment
for multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. 369 U.S.
186 at 217 (1962).
Subsequent affirmance of the six point "Baker test" came in Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486 (1969). In that case, Congressman Adam Clayton Powell contested his
exclusion from the 90th Congress due to alleged misconduct; holding, that the question
involved was not political by virtue of the Constitution under the "textual commitment"
test of Baker. The House of Representatives has the right to exclude a member if he
does not satisfy one of the tests under art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
However, in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the Court declared
that even without specific constitutional authorization, the political branches of government would possess extensive powers not subject to scrutiny by the judiciary in the
field of foreign relations. Curtiss-Wright and those of a like genre reveal that the
courts may be more circumspect in reaching the merits of conduct in foreign relations
than when purely internal questions are involved. See Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.,
246 U.S. 297 (1918) ; C & S Airlines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948)
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
When applied in the foreign affairs context, the political question doctrine
reflects policies different from those which underlie its domestic counterpart. Four
criteria are especially relevant in determining whether to apply the foreign affairs
branch of the political question doctrine in any given case. First, a court must consider whether the nature of the case would require the court to examine extraordinarily
large amounts of data or statistics in reaching its decision. The sheer volume of information to be assayed may, from a logistical standpoint, render the dispute inappropriate for judicial treatment. Similarly, the nature of the data itself may take the
case beyond the competence of the bench, even assuming that expert witnesses are
available to interpret the information. Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689, 702. So too,
in certain instances, the information necessary in reaching that reasoned judgment
should remain confidential. However, if the court is constrained from evaluating all
the facts because of the confidentiality of the information, any adjudication on the
merits could profoundly affect the nation's international posture. See C & S Airlines
v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. at 111. Secondly, a court should take into consideration its ability to evaluate and predict the international consequences of judicial
intervention. Where the potential effects of adjudicaton on international relations
are serious and the ultimate results uncertain, a court should probably refrain from
exercising jurisdiction. See Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. at 311. Thirdly,
the general absence of established legal standards in the area of foreign relations may
render a particular controversy unsuitable for judicial resolution. Id. Finally, and
most importantly, a court must discern to what extent the resolution of foreign
affairs-related disputes to be decided has been textually committed by the Constitution
to the discretion of the political branches of government. The court must in all such
cases assess whether judicial intervention will seriously disturb the distribution of
functions among the coordinate branches of government with regard to the conduct
of foreign relations. This analysis is not inconsistent with the Court's discussion of
foreign relations in Baker at 211-12:
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'There are sweeping statements to the effect that all questions touching foreign
relations are political questions .... Yet it is error to suppose that every case or
controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance. Our
cases in this field seem invariably to show a discriminating analysis of the particular question posed, in terms of the history of its management by the political
branches, of its susceptibility to judicial handling in the light of its nature and
posture in the specific case, and of possible consequences of judicial action.
See also Powell at 518. See generally Tigar, Ask A Political Question, You Get
A Political Answer, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 1344 (1974) ; Note, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1135
(1970) ; Yokota, Political Questions and Judicial Review: A Comparison,43 WASH. L.
REV. 1031 (1968) ; Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Questions: A Functional
Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966); A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH
(1962).
The Second Circuit, in Dreyfus, relied predominantly on purely "domestic"
cases to justify its conclusion that judicial review would ,be precluded by the political
question doctrine. The proper approach would have been to follow the analysis outlined in Powell v. McCormack in which the Supreme Court focused on the four
criteria mentioned above in deciding whether the political question doctrine required
avoidance in a foreign affairs case. A more appropriate analysis when dealing with
foreign policy adjudication is to focus primary attention of the first three criteria
outlined above which raise grave questions when interfaced with the foreign affairs
area. See Atlee at 703.
Applying these criteria to the facts of Dreyfus, it is clear that the political
question doctrine would not prevent the court from entertaining Dreyfus' claim for
restitution. There was no need for the court to assimilate any great amount of data
to decide the plaintiff's claim for compensation. No more data analysis would be
required than that in an ordinary domestic breach of contract suit. Secondly, the
impact of judicial intervention in international relations would be minimal. The
longstanding policies of both the U.S. and German governments favor the payment of
Wiedergutmachung ("reparation") to victims of the Nazi holocaust. Any judgment
against a West German national requiring the latter to pay additional compensation
for property involuntarily transferred at the behest of the Hitler regime would be
unlikely to endanger United States-West German relations. Recently, however, deportation proceedings were instituted against Karlis Detlavs for his alleged fraudulent
procurement of a United States entry visa in 1950. He is charged with participation
in executing Jews at the Riga-Dwinsk Ghettos and in the Pogulanka Woods in 1941.
See Detlavs v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Civ. No. 77-1776 (D. Md.,
filed Oct. 25, 1977).
Thirdly, there is no problem with identifying and applying settled principles of
law, since plaintiff's only viable claim for relief is founded in the provisions of Military
Law No. 59 which sets forth in relatively clear terms the prerequisites for restitution.
Finally, the traditional judicial concern of interference with the prerogatives of the
political branches in the conduct of foreign relations should not present any obstacles
to adjudication in Dreyfus. The State Department has stated on at least one prior
occasion that it sees no reason to bar judicial resolution of claims arising out of Nazi
confiscation for fear of encroaching upon the Executive Branch in the area of foreign
affairs. See "Tate Letter," note 17 supra.

